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Abstract  
  
The empowerment of marginalised communities to lead local responses to HIV/AIDS 
is a key strategy of funding agencies’ globalised HIV/AIDS policies, given evidence 
that disempowerment is a root source of vulnerability to HIV. We report on two 
multilevel ethnographies at the interface between HIV prevention projects for sex 
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workers in India and their funding environment, examining the extent to which the 
funding environment itself promotes or undermines sex worker empowerment. We 
show how the ‘new managerialism’ characteristic of the funding system undermines 
sex worker leadership of HIV interventions. By requiring local projects to conform to 
global management standards, funding agencies risk undermining the very localism 
and empowerment that their intervention policies espouse.   
  
Keywords: HIV/AIDS; empowerment; community; new managerialism; funding 
agencies; global  
  
   
  
Given evidence that disempowerment is a root source of vulnerability to HIV (e.g. 
Blankenship, West, Kershaw, & Biradavolu, 2008), empowerment of marginalised 
groups is widely advocated in funding agencies’ HIV policies. Empowerment, in this 
context, is understood not only in the narrow sense of people gaining greater control 
over their health-related behaviours, but also in a broad sense, of gaining greater 
control in their everyday lives (Dworkin & Ehrhardt, 2007). But to what extent does 
the funding system itself promote or undermine community empowerment? This 
paper offers an answer to this question by examining the relation between two local 
HIV/AIDS intervention projects for sex workers in India and their funding 
environment. To sustain their activities, projects must succeed, not only in their 
health promoting work in the brothels, but also in their proposal-writing and reporting 
work oriented to funding agencies’ boardrooms. We shall argue that the complex 
administrative practices required by funding agencies effectively disempower sex 
workers, undermining funders’ stated aim of grassroots leadership and 
empowerment.   
  
Critical development literature articulates the intricate relation between global funding 
regimes and local implementation practices (e.g. Hillhorst, 2003; Mosse, 2005). This 
work shows that it is not possible to properly understand intervention practices 
without placing them in the context of the demands emanating from the aid system 
(Kelly & Birdsall, 2010). The aid system is not a neutral facilitator of interventions, but 
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deeply implicated in the forms that projects take. In the HIV/AIDS literature which is 
motivated by an interest in improving health outcomes (rather than theorising 
development), however, the influence of funding regimes has been a blind spot. 
Efforts to explain the success or failure of intervention practices focus on the 
behaviour of ‘target groups’, frontline health promotion workers, or at most, the local 
context, neglecting the role of powerful systems and actors (Campbell & Cornish, in 
press; Stephens, 2010). It is rarely acknowledged that funding agencies themselves 
comprise an important environment for projects, with concrete implications for their 
health promotion practices (for an exception, see Aveling, 2011; this issue).   
  
By questioning how funding regimes implicitly constitute the activities of HIV/AIDS 
projects, and how projects creatively adapt to these regimes, we seek to make 
visible how the demands of the funding system may bring about unanticipated and 
undesired consequences. We do so through multi-level ethnographic studies of two 
HIV prevention projects for sex workers in India, focusing on a contradiction between 
funders’ policies of empowerment and the disempowering nature of their procedures 
for obtaining and administering funding.  
HIV policy: Favouring a local response?  
  
Around the globe, it has become widely accepted that HIV/AIDS interventions are 
most appropriately delivered by local, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
using peer education to encourage behaviour change (de Waal, 2003; Seckinelgin, 
2008). In India, following the policies of the major national and international funders, 
a plethora of local non-governmental organisations and community-based 
organisations (CBOs), are charged with delivering ‘targeted interventions’ to the ‘high 
risk groups’ of female sex workers, men who have sex with men, and injecting drug 
users (Avahan, 2008; NACO, 2006). ‘CBOs’ have a particular definition in this 
context: their membership is limited to ‘community members’, i.e., people who can 
be classified as falling into one of the ‘high risk groups’ (Avahan, 2008; NACO, 
2006). The rationale is that local organisations are best positioned to be responsive 
to local needs, allowing for diversity and empowerment in the HIV/AIDS response.    
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Recognising that social marginalization and disempowerment are at the root of these 
groups’ vulnerability to HIV, policies explicitly advocate their participation and 
empowerment in the intervention process. For instance, the government-sponsored 
programme aims for 50% of HIV prevention interventions to be led by CBOs by 2011 
(NACO, 2006). The major philanthropic donor, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
also seeks to ‘hand over’ interventions to CBOs (Avahan, 2008). This means that 
organisations comprising and led by female sex workers, men who have sex with 
men, or injecting drug users, are to be actively involved in delivering, managing, and 
leading HIV prevention projects, and ultimately to directly receive HIV prevention 
funds into their bank accounts. In one sense, then, the ‘global’ force (as represented 
by funding policies) is ‘localising’, giving priority to the local.   
  
Simultaneously, however, the value attributed to local diversity and ownership is 
undermined by the homogenous and prescriptive nature of funders’ policies (Kelly & 
Birdsall, 2010). Characterised by practices of ‘new managerialism’ (Dar & Cooke, 
2008), the funding consensus extends, in prescriptive detail, to the activities, staffing, 
and monitoring of HIV interventions, so that personnel and achievements become 
interchangeable and comparable on universal indicators. Incorporating NGOs and  
CBOs into the funders’ bureaucratic service provision model risks erasing the very 
local responsiveness deemed to be their special strength (Mawdsley, Porter 
&Townsend, 2005).  
Theory: Projects adapting to fit their environments  
  
It is tempting, given the vast asymmetries of material and symbolic power between 
global funding agencies and local community projects, to map this relationship onto 
longstanding binaries, such as global-local, powerful-powerless, structure-agency, or 
centre-periphery. However, careful scrutiny of how projects play out in practice 
refutes the validity of such binaries. As Massey (2004) argues, what we term the  
‘global’ is just as concrete and embodied as the ‘local’. ‘Global’ processes, such as 
international agreements on funding mechanisms, are peopled by specific actors and 
created through concrete practices. This is not to suggest that global processes are 
flat, even, and accessible to all. On the contrary, globalisation is ‘uneven’, connecting 
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particular people together but not others (Massey, 2006). This ‘uneven’ globalisation 
is powerful, but not deterministic, since, in formulating local projects, local actors are 
always inventive, creative, sometimes complicit, sometimes resistant (Mosse & 
Lewis, 2006).    
  
The form that an intervention project takes, then, is neither wholly the result of 
creative local agency, nor the simple imprint of a powerful global donor’s conception. 
Rather, projects are adaptations, serviceable forms that can sustain credibility 
among their different audiences (Mosse, 2005). The ostensible environment of an 
HIV prevention project comprises the local settings in which risk behaviours are 
practiced and shaped, such as brothels and local political or policing practices 
(Nhamo, Campbell & Gregson, 2010). However, a second environment is equally 
crucial, namely the funding environment, in particular, the representations among 
global funders of what a successful project should be (Aveling, 2010; Swidler & 
Watkins, 2009).   
  
The funding environment may not be at a different ‘scale’ to the local intervention 
environment (Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005), but it remains a distinctive 
environment, with its own economy of targets and grants, a language (often English) 
of logframes, mission statements, aims, objectives, outputs and outcomes, and 
social conventions such as working groups, minuted meetings, documentation of 
activities, emailing and applying for funding. This environment is evidently not 
equally accessible or navigable to all, but calls for specific cultural capital and skills. 
Successful, fundable projects become possible through the work of intermediaries, 
or ‘brokers’, who mediate between the contrasting environments of red light area and 
funding scheme, brothel and boardroom, translating the priorities of each into the 
language and activities of the other (Aveling, 2011; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Mosse,  
2005). Such ‘boundary crossers’ (Kilpatrick, Cheers, Gilles & Taylor, 2009), who 
move between boardrooms and brothels, have rich concrete experience from both 
domains and are thus uniquely placed to coordinate and integrate the possibilities 
and constraints of both sides (Gillespie & Richardson, 2011).   
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Following this theoretical perspective, we take as our data the adaptations made by 
our case study projects in response to their funding environment, using this data to 
shed light on our question of the extent to which the global funding environment 
constitutes local sex workers as empowered or not.   
The studies  
  
We report on ethnographic studies at the interface between two HIV prevention 
projects for sex workers in India and their funders. In this context, sex workers are 
overwhelmingly poor women with little formal education, selling sex to provide for 
their own survival and their families’ needs. As is standard in India’s targeted 
interventions, both projects use peer education (i.e. train sex workers to be health 
workers), to promote condom use and attendance at health clinics. Their duration is 
less standard, both being long-standing, established in the mid-1990s, and thereby 
having continually adapted to changing funding environments. Their guiding 
philosophies also distinguish them: both prioritise sex workers’ empowerment and 
aim for sex workers to take increasing ownership and leadership. One is in western 
India, one in eastern India, one is urban, one rural. One is primarily 
governmentsponsored, the other primarily funded by a philanthropic donor. To 
preserve anonymity, we have removed identifying details of the projects and persons 
we refer to.   
  
We report on 6 months of observational fieldwork in each site (recorded in daily 
diaries), during which fieldworkers attended regular project activities, including 
meetings in red light areas or project offices, and undertook informal (unrecorded) 
interviews. We also draw on interviews with project staff, both sex workers (30) and 
non-sex-workers (15). Sex worker participants worked as peer educators and  
‘outreach workers’ for the projects. Non-sex-worker NGO workers were based 
primarily in NGO offices rather than the field, with responsibilities including managing 
peer educators, training, monitoring & evaluation, and report-writing. Published 
documents, particularly funders’ policies, provided data on the context.     
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Our analytic method is genealogical (Gillespie, 2006), in that, beginning with the 
concrete form that projects take, we seek to read off the context which produced that 
particular form (in this case, the funding context). Practically, our analysis first 
extracted all material in which we could discern adaptation to funding agencies. 
Analysing this material, four themes resulted, presented in the following four 
sections. The first illustrates the relatively familiar point that, in implementing funding 
agencies’ prescriptions for intervention designs, projects adapt those designs to fit 
local contexts. The subsequent two sections each show how puzzling characteristics 
of the HIV response in India – namely the organisational form of ‘NGO-CBO pairs’, 
and the continuing major role of project founders – can be explained as adaptations 
to funding regimes. The fourth section examines prospects for sex worker leadership 
of HIV interventions.   
  
Adapting intervention design to reflect local realities   
  
While funding policies are prescriptive regarding official project structures, activities, 
and reporting, paperwork is their medium of operation. Turning official project 
definitions into practices allows for leeway in adapting funders’ definitions to suit 
local constraints. The definition of a ‘sex worker’, a ‘meeting’, and ‘appropriate 
remuneration’ all came up for local debate during our fieldwork. One project’s 
funders expected a certain number of community meetings to be held per month, to 
inform people about HIV and mobilise their support. NGO-CBO representatives felt 
that the quota was unrealistically high. Having worked in the community for many 
years, they feared they would only annoy local people by re-recruiting participants 
who had already heard their messages. Exactly what constitutes ‘a meeting’ or ‘a 
sex worker’, however, is a matter of interpretation. While the official purpose of 
organising an HIV awareness meeting for sex workers might be to convey HIV 
prevention messages to ‘new contacts’, peer educators are also sex workers and 
arguably legitimate participants in a meeting, as are sex workers who are already 
familiar with the project – though they have heard the messages before. Similarly, 
when one meeting begins and another ends is potentially a grey area, allowing for 
interpretation.    
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Discrepancies between funding bodies regarding the level of salaries which they 
authorise for similar posts had led to local adaptations in the other project. To cope 
with such discrepancies, they had decided not to accept the full level of salaries on 
offer, in one instance. We noted in fieldnotes an NGO worker’s reasons:    
  
From [funding agency], he said, for a Project Co-ordinator, the level of salary 
available is Rs. 20,000. But in [this NGO/CBO], they take Rs.12,000 for this 
post. His reason is that ‘we are an NGO, we cannot afford high salaries. 
When this funding ends, and if people get used to having a vehicle, a better 
lifestyle, then they won’t be able to accept a lower salary. Also, if people have 
the same post, but through another funding body, they might be remunerated 
at a different level and this would not be fair.’ So they do not take the extra. 
They don’t think it is sustainable.  
  
Similarly, when we, as researchers, offered remuneration to sex workers in return for 
their participation in interviews, both CBOs declined the offer, explaining that they did 
not want to set a precedent that participation in NGO-CBO activities was to be 
rewarded by material gain. Sariola (2009) notes in her study of southern Indian 
NGOs, that it was a general assumption that material rewards such as meals or saris 
were required to incentivise sex worker’s participation. Our case study CBOs sought 
to resist such a commodification of participation, and maintain an identity as activist 
community organisations rather than the role of service provider with quotas to fill, 
into which they are often cast by HIV prevention funders.   
  
Adaptations of the intervention design come about when project actors face a 
contradiction between what is locally appropriate and what their funder expects. In 
these instances, the projects prioritised the local, revealing their scope for ignoring or 
interpreting their funders’ project designs. They did not always have so much 
leeway, as the following section shows.   
HIV project organisation: NGO-CBO pairs  
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The mode of delivering HIV/AIDS interventions in India has developed a peculiar 
organisational form, which could be called ‘NGO-CBO pairs’. In individual red light 
areas, not one organisation, but two, are typically jointly involved in HIV prevention 
activities: one NGO and one CBO. NGOs are generally staffed by ‘technical staff’, 
people who are not ‘from the community’, who have professional qualifications and 
skills (such as social work, counselling, accountancy, or project management) 
deemed useful to running an intervention. CBOs, in this context, are sex workers’ 
organisations, whose membership is restricted to sex workers. Both of our case 
study projects took the form of an NGO-CBO pair. HIV interventions, until the 
mid2000s, had traditionally been led by NGOs, but since the advent of policies with 
targets for CBO involvement, there has been a ‘mushrooming’ of CBOs across India.   
  
What is the reason for this duplication of organisations? Simply put, we argue that it 
results from contradictory demands from funding agencies, which call for projects to 
be both community-led on the one hand and bureaucratically sophisticated on the 
other. On one hand, as outlined above, ‘CBOs’ are considered, in Indian HIV 
policies, appropriate ‘owners’ and ‘leaders’ of HIV interventions.     
  
On the other hand, the forms of management and reporting required of organisations 
to evidence proper use of public funds practically exclude ‘community members’ 
from fully owning and leading the management of interventions. For instance, the  
National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) produces ‘Operational Guidelines’ for 
the selection process through which NGOs/CBOs may be appointed to deliver HIV 
prevention (NACO, 2007). The guidelines list 7 areas for appraisal (governance, 
staffing and organisation, experience, financial management systems, procurement 
systems, planning, monitoring and reporting systems, external relationship), with 3-8 
specific questions under each area (NACO, 2007, p. 12-13). Organisations are 
required to produce an organogram, mission statements, minutes of meetings and 
annual reports. They should have accounting and procurement systems in place, 
and written recruitment, gender, staff welfare and staff appraisal policies (NACO, 
2007, p.10-14). In sum, to effectively navigate the funding environment, NGOs and  
CBOs must be highly ‘professional’ organisations, where professionalism means 
being able to implement the managerial requirements of the funding bodies.   
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The demanding managerial requirements were evident not only in written policies but 
also in the field. During our fieldwork, we heard complaints from representatives of 
both government and philanthropic funders about the informal nature of the projects’ 
processes. We noted in our fieldnotes after a meeting with an MBA-qualified funder’s 
representative:   
  
Without us asking for it, [funder’s representative] started to speak about the 
‘gaps’ in [CBO’s] work, […]: a ‘stakeholder analysis’ and ‘gap analysis’ that 
apparently they haven’t done, and then a whole lot of management process 
(including a human resources policy, a gender policy, process documentation, 
sexual harassment policy, sustainability plan).  
  
We were surprised to hear him lament the lack of a stakeholder analysis, as our own 
observations had noted particularly impressive work with stakeholders. Moreover, for 
an organisation rooted in grassroots activism among members with low levels of 
literacy, written gender or sexual harassment policies seemed a poor means of 
addressing such concerns, and unlikely to secure the ‘community ownership’ that the 
funder ostensibly advocated.   
  
At the other site, a funders’ representative expressed his puzzlement to us regarding 
the CBO’s lack of formal membership and leadership processes:    
  
He said that [CBO]’s decision-making processes are very vague, and the lack 
of a membership register is a problem[…] - that if a funder has a pot of money 
and [CBO] say that they are working for 5500 women [i.e., apply for funds to 
cover this number of beneficiaries], well, it is not all that convincing. He 
intimated that ‘not so many opportunities would be available’ if they lacked 
these management processes.  
  
The funders needed the membership register to enable them to decide on funding 
allocations, and decision-making and leadership processes to demonstrate 
appropriate governance mechanisms. An NGO worker explained to us the CBO’s 
11  
  
point of view, namely that any sex worker who is in contact with them is a member, 
and any sex worker is eligible for their help, without need for a registration number. 
He added that decision-making is accountable, being done collectively, in meetings, 
and that although they do not have elections, annual meetings are held with 
opportunities for new people to come forward. In this instance, there was a clash 
between the locally preferred form of a CBO and the form of CBO judged to meet 
global governance standards.  
  
Although the funding agencies’ written policies advocate CBO leadership, the 
managerial practices required by them necessitate ranks of professionally qualified 
staff. NGO-CBO pairs is an organisational form that emerges as a response to these 
contradictory demands. While the dual commitments to both community 
empowerment and managerial practices are characteristic of global HIV policy, the 
particularly restrictive definition of CBOs, in Indian HIV policy, as comprising 
‘community members’, makes the contradiction between these dual commitments 
particularly salient, as it becomes embodied in dual organisations (CBO and NGO).   
Continuing reliance on project founders   
  
In both projects, the original highly-educated, upper middle class project founders 
remained an important presence. In the early days, the founders took responsibility 
for all aspects of the projects, gradually handing over leadership responsibilities to 
sex workers and other NGO workers. The single activity that remained largely the 
founders’ preserve, however, was the work of interfacing with the funders. We 
identified three ways in which founders mediated between the distant world of 
funding boardrooms and the local projects.   
  
Firstly, the project founders were sometimes in a position of representing the 
authority of the global funders, assessing whether the work of the project was 
meeting the criteria that their funders required. For instance, in one case, on the day 
before a visit to one of the clinics by the founder, we observed a serious atmosphere 
of preparation as the peer educators busily practised their technical HIV-related 
knowledge (the knowledge expected of them by their funders), in case they would be 
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tested on it. Similarly in the other, the founder maintained high expectations of the 
quality of the HIV prevention work, as an NGO worker reported:   
  
She demands hard and fast results. She expects quick results. That is 
justified. As a commander or a team leader it is only right that she expects 
that.   
  
In both cases, the founders command enormous respect on the part of project 
workers, who are anxious to meet their high expectations for project performance 
according to funders’ criteria.   
  
Secondly, the founders interpret funding agency requirements for the projects, 
translating them into locally-relevant actionable strategies and language. Both 
founders, in their role as representatives of successful HIV prevention projects, are 
regularly invited into the boardroom, as consultants, speakers, or working group 
members at policy-making or policy-informing events convened by national and 
international agencies (e.g. NACO, UNAIDS). This experience equips them to 
interpret global HIV policies for local action. In one study site, for example, the day 
after a delegation of sex workers and non-sex-workers returned from an international 
or national event (such as a sexual health conference or a meeting with funders), it 
was standard practice for the founder to hold a meeting to interpret the messages of 
the event, for those who had been present there, as much as for those who had not. 
Similarly, when unfamiliar people approached the CBO with a request, they were 
asked to wait for a response, while the issue was brought to a meeting, where the 
founder would help interpret that request. A funder’s suggestion to route funding 
directly to the CBO, a journalist’s proposal for a news story, or a researcher’s 
request for research access were strange requests from different worlds, and lacked 
obvious meaning  to the sex worker representatives. The founders, with their 
experience of these different worlds, were in a position to interpret them.   
  
In the other site, during a ‘retreat’ for project employees, the founder, recently 
returned from consulting on national HIV policy, gave a talk outlining new policies 
and their implications for HIV interventions, including changes to the ‘target groups’ 
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eligible for funding, increasing importance of evaluations, and new opportunities to 
serve as training organisations. She was able to provide concrete answers to 
questions about the priorities of the funder, and how to meet their criteria for 
recognition as a legitimate service provider.  
  
Thirdly, the founders sought to cultivate the NGO-CBOs’ awareness of their public 
image and how to manage it. In the retreat mentioned above, the founder 
emphasised that the organisation’s public reputation was key to their chances of 
selection as a service provider for the new HIV/AIDS programme. Our fieldnotes 
quoted her saying:    
  
‘You need to publicize what you have done. In today’s society, what I do 
sitting back at home does not matter, how I can market my product, sell it in 
the market – all depends on that’.   
  
To know which image of the NGO-CBOs to present depends on a rich understanding 
of the audience. The gulf between the worlds of red light area and funder makes 
such an understanding difficult. In both cases, CBO and NGO representatives often 
presented an idealised image of their activities, to us as researchers, to potential 
funders, and to the media. For instance, sweeping statements that there were no 
longer any trafficked women or exploitative madams were intended to reflect the 
projects’ significant achievements, but sounded naïve and unrealistic to experienced 
funding agency representatives or journalists. We heard funders’ representatives 
express frustration at a perceived gap between projects’ self-presentations and the 
realities on the ground. This observation is not news to one of the founders, who 
sought to help the CBO representatives better align their self-presentations with the 
sophisticated understandings held by their funders, as we noted in fieldnotes 
recording her contributions to a project meeting:   
  
‘You keep on saying that [CBO] is good, all is fine. There are no problems at 
all. By saying so you are giving wrong impressions. Why is [CBO] so 
insecure? […] This is the reason that [funder representative] and other people 
ask us these questions. Because you are not giving them a correct picture. 
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You always try to portray that all is very good, nothing is wrong, so our 
behaviour is suspected. […]Be realistic.’   
  
Through such activities, project founders, as intermediaries, serve as buffers 
between the changing requirements of the funding environment, and the practical 
activities of the NGOs-CBOs. For the NGO-CBOs, the stakes are high – their 
survival depends upon continued funding – but the environment is distant and 
impenetrable. The founders seek to make that distant world interpretable and 
actionable. Their continuing presence, we suggest, is not because they have clung 
on to power, but is another adaptation to the complex and changing funding 
environment which calls for significant policy-mindedness. Funding agencies have 
helped the founders to gain this policy-mindedness by inviting them into the 
boardrooms, constituting them as lynch-pin ‘boundary-crossers’. Given funding 
policies’ ostensible commitment to ‘community leadership’ of HIV interventions, our 
final section questions the prospects for sex workers to take on the leadership role of 
mediator between boardroom and brothel.   
  
Prospects for sex workers’ project leadership   
  
Both projects had achieved significant progress towards their aims of sex worker 
leadership and empowerment. In this section, we follow the development, over time, 
of sex workers’ leadership capacities.   
  
To empower one of the most excluded and marginalised groups in Indian society 
was a challenging goal. When the projects began, local sex workers’ experience was 
predominantly of the world of the red light areas. Many described having no 
confidence even within their occupation, for example, to negotiate with madams or 
clients. Few had experience of working for, let alone running, intervention projects.  
Our fieldnotes recorded one project’s founder describing the sex workers’ initial 
disempowerment in relation to the middle-class professionals instigating the project:    
  
15  
  
[Founder] told a story of when she began, and was to recruit sex workers to 
be peer educators, her boss drew up a 2 page list of selection criteria and 
they interviewed the women. They asked the first question: ‘What is your 
name?’ and the women covered their faces with their saris and mumbled so 
they could not be heard. [Founder] suggested: ‘how about 1 selection 
criterion: those who can speak without covering their faces?’    
  
Local institutions such as hospitals were also inhospitable places for sex worker 
empowerment. A long-standing peer educator described her project’s complaints in 
the early days, regarding the inaccessibility of the hospital:   
  
[Our position towards the hospital was:] You ask us to take the patient to the 
hospital. But after taking them there, you would say, ‘go to Number 1 and get 
the case paper, get it stamped at Number 2, pay money at Number 3, and at  
Number 4 and 5, show the doctor’. Even after doing all this, you go to Number  
4, you lose time. The doctor gets up and leaves. Even when you meet them,  
they won't touch your hands and do a checkup [due to stigmatization]. After 
doing all that, we decided in the big meeting ‘how will the patient survive?’   
  
At the outset, then, institutional environments, including HIV intervention projects, 
were daunting, uninviting, and disempowering to sex workers. Over time, however, 
both projects have made strides in enabling sex worker leadership. At the red-
lightarea level, sex workers have become highly skilled and highly regarded as 
leaders and problem-solvers. They are skilled in navigating the complex political and 
interpersonal issues that regularly arise, such as a violent dispute between a sex 
worker and her regular partner, conflicts between neighbouring sex workers, or 
abuse by local hoodlums. For such problems, both CBOs have procedures for 
sending a representative on a ‘fact-finding’ mission, holding local meetings, 
interviewing both sides in a dispute, and coming to a decision on appropriate action.   
  
Sex workers’ empowerment in relation to local institutions has also grown. Both 
projects have systematically involved sex workers in the full range of project work, 
including in negotiations with their external stakeholders. In both places, sex worker 
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leaders have gained expertise in negotiating with police, becoming familiar with the 
laws and procedures of policing. One project has negotiated with the local hospital to 
provide office space for an advocate for sex worker patients. In both, sex workers 
spoke proudly of their newfound skills in public speaking, representing their peers, 
and problem-solving. Overall, the CBOs’ sex workers were typically capable of 
resolving local issues without the involvement of NGO workers.   
  
It was when a problem involved acting in relation to people or institutions beyond the 
familiar red light area that the limits on sex workers’ leadership became evident. Sex 
worker leaders typically sought the guidance of the projects’ original founders when 
they faced decisions regarding the projects’ funders. One CBO requested help, for 
instance, to interpret the significance of their funder’s suggestion to route funds 
directly to the CBO rather than via the NGO. An NGO worker told us:   
  
Our women don’t understand the language of development with funders, 
government and other groups. But when we talk about development with 
these women, we use the language they can understand. We [NGO-CBO] are 
not able to put ourselves forward in a correct way. This is what we lack. So if 
we want to upgrade ourselves at NGO level, then we should learn the process 
and technicalities.   
  
Sex workers’ and NGO workers’ ‘lack’, here, is relational. It is a lack in relation to an 
environment that disempowers them. While the NGO worker describes his NGO- 
CBO colleagues as ‘lacking’ the language of development, funding agencies are 
rarely described as lacking the language of the brothels. In our other study site, the  
NGO’s training officers were unhappy with the funder-provided training. Our 
fieldnotes recorded their complaints that:   
  
the resource persons are more consultancy types and bookish - using laptops 
and projectors. They gave the example that the person who gave the training 
on advocacy even spoke throughout in English! […] The morning after the 
training, they have to explain to the women what it was all about, because 
nobody has understood.  
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That funding agencies habitually use English is just the most concrete example of 
the disempowering discrepancy between the cultures of sex worker and funder, of 
brothel and boardroom.   
  
While sex workers have become significantly empowered in relation to their local red 
light areas, and their local institutions of hospitals and police stations, they remain 
disempowered in relation to the funding environment. ‘Global’ funding systems are 
not sufficiently global to include sex workers from the red light areas of India. Indeed, 
from the sex workers’ point of view, these systems are abstruse, arcane, exotic even 
– qualities more usually associated with ‘the local’.     
Conclusion   
In this paper, we have examined how funding agencies comprise an important 
environment to which HIV intervention projects adapt. The projects that we have 
studied had to adapt to two quite different environments, namely, they had to 
organise health promotion activities suited to impoverished sex workers, while also 
fulfilling funding agencies’ requirements in relation to global conventions of 
management, monitoring, and accountability. Moreover, they have had to adapt to a 
contradiction between what funding agencies want to fund (namely grassroots 
community-based organisations) and how they want to administer funding (namely, 
using procedures alien to marginalised communities). Adapting to these different and 
even contradictory environments, projects have engaged in creative, locally 
intelligent interpretation of funder’s guidelines, split into NGO-CBO pairs, and 
capitalised on the peculiar skills of their boundary-crossing founders.   
These local adaptations are intelligent responses to their funding environment, 
enabling the projects to continue to source funds for their health promoting and 
empowering activities. In this sense, they are positive achievements. However, from 
the point of view of funding agencies’ stated commitment to sex worker leadership 
and empowerment, the need for such adaptations is more problematic. Funding 
agencies’ policies and administrative procedures are impenetrable to sex workers, 
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undermining their leadership of their NGO-CBOs. The environment constituted by 
funding agencies does not further their stated objective of sex worker empowerment.   
In relation to conceptions of the global and the local, our analysis substantiates  
Massey’s (2006) argument that the process of globalisation is ‘uneven’. Through the 
processes of providing international funding for local HIV projects, the distance 
between Washington or Delhi and a brothel in rural India becomes short for some 
(e.g. project founders with experience of the policy environment), but immensely far 
for others (e.g. sex workers without such experience). Through the globalisation of 
‘new managerialism’, institutional logics of bureaucracy and performance 
management, have gained a ‘global’ familiarity for a limited audience – for 
policymakers and managers from Bangkok to Seattle or Lilongwe – but remain 
obscure and inaccessible to grassroots workers in these same cities (Townsend, 
Porter & Mawdsley, 2002; Swidler & Watkins, 2009).  
Returning to policy commitments to sex worker empowerment and leadership, our 
findings have several implications. Firstly, funding agencies could consider the 
extent to which their own procedures and practices further their ostensible aims. It is 
not only within their work in the brothels that empowerment is an issue for sex 
workers, but also within their work in the NGOs. Given that the NGO sector, funded 
through globalised aid systems, is such a major employer of poor people in 
developing countries, the empowerment or disempowerment of these people in their 
workplaces ought to be of concern. Funding agency constraints are one force 
structuring the possibility of such empowerment.   
Secondly, for projects to live up to their potential, envisaged by funding agencies, to 
be responsive and appropriate to local needs, they need to be able to adapt funders’ 
prescriptions to suit the local setting (Kilby, 2004) – as our case study projects did so 
skilfully. Such processes of interpretation and mediation may be best accomplished 
through long-term, responsive relationships between funding agency representatives 
and NGO representatives, as Eyben (2006) has argued. Turning written policies into 
concrete practices is always a matter of interpretation, and funding agencies need to 
tolerate, even facilitate, such interpretation.    
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Thirdly, what are the prospects for sex workers to take on the leadership role of 
interfacing with their funding agencies? We have argued (following Kilpatrick et al., 
2009; Gillespie & Richardson, 2011) that the intermediary role of the project founders 
was not due to individual characteristics of these particular founders, but that they 
acquired this skill through gaining rich experience both of brothels and of 
boardrooms. If our suggestion about the value of boundary-crossing is correct, 
funding agencies could create opportunities for repeated boundary-crossing for sex 
workers, that is, inviting sex workers to participate meaningfully in the world of 
disbursing funds and making policies (e.g. offering them real decision-making power 
and accountable responsibility in the allocation of funds). Such an initiative could 
yield two positive outcomes. Sex workers’ experience from the brothels could inform 
boardroom discussions so that funding procedures become more responsive to local 
realities. In turn, sex workers’ experience in the boardrooms would equip them with 
understanding of the funding environment to bring back to their projects.   
International funding agencies face a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. They want 
projects to be led by CBOs because they are local, innovative, responsive to local 
needs, and have the identification and support of the community – all things that 
externally-led, government or charitable schemes often lack. However, to make 
decisions on where to allocate their funding, to evaluate their impact, and to maintain 
standards of intervention design, funding agencies create complicated schemes for 
project design and assessment (see Piot, 2010). In incorporating community 
organisations into their bureaucratic regimes, funding agencies risk turning 
community organisations into professional service providers, governed by the same 
limiting practices as large government or charity programmes – thus losing the very 
localism that made them attractive in the first place.   
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